Too much, too soon?

Robert Karniol, Defence Writer

THERE is a basic precept among defence analysts that is too easily overlooked: the acquisition of some sophisticated platform or system does not necessarily translate into an effective capability.

The commissioning in 1997 of Thailand's first and only aircraft carrier, the HTMS Chakri Naruebet, offers a vivid case in point. Over a dozen years later, it remains operationally irrelevant, an unintentional symbol of misplaced vanity.

Vietnam's military buying spree, spotlighted by a recent flurry of activity, is unlikely to prove so ill-conceived. But neither should it be problem-free.

A formidable force for much of the time since its founding in 1944, the Vietnam People's Army (VPA) began looking drained in the early 1990s. The armed forces were worn out from fighting in Cambodia, the country's economy appeared moribund and Moscow had shut its tap of support.

Hanoi launched economic reforms in 1986 under a programme known as Doi Moi, initially producing modest gains in GDP and then a sharp upward spike from 2004. Defence procurement over this period of nearly 20 years was constrained, leaving the VPA preserved in aspic with equipment largely dating from the 1960s.

This era is typified by Hanoi's acquisition of Sukhoi Su-27 air superiority fighters, aimed to begin updating the air force. The VPA's first contract involved just six platforms purchased in 1995 compared with China's first contract for 26 signed in 1992, and the difference has since multiplied.

Perhaps more significantly, China has now linked its advanced fighters to airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft vital to their effective operation in an integrated battle space. Vietnam's advanced fighters, absent this force multiplier, are little more than a faster variant of the aircraft they replace.

VPA defence procurements have been patchy and sporadic for a couple of decades, which is hardly indicative of a natural progression. But buoyed by economic growth and further spurred by the growing obsolescence of VPA kit, Hanoi is increasingly focused on force modernisation.

Speaking last month on the VPA's 65th anniversary, Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet called on the army to quickly modernise. A couple of weeks earlier, commenting on Hanoi's release of a new defence White Paper, Deputy Minister of National Defence Nguyen Chi Vinh suggested much the same in saying that force modernisation will gain greater emphasis if the country's economy continues growing.

Providing substance to these statements, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung was in Moscow around the same time to finalise the purchase of six Kilo class submarines and 12 Su-30MKK fighter aircraft. Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh was meanwhile in France exploring for helicopters and transport aircraft, and in Washington looking for the United States to ease restrictions on military sales.

Also last month, and yet to be made public, Hanoi reached agreement to buy three DHC-6 Series 400 amphibious aircraft from Viking Air of Canada for use by the navy's nascent air wing in the maritime patrol role. The mission suite will be centred on the EL/M 2022(V)3 multimode maritime surveillance radar from Elta Electronics of Israel, with deliveries due to start in 12 to 18 months.

The maritime patrol aircraft, together with the submarines, will enable the navy to become a three-dimensional force.

'Vietnam's acquisition of six Kilo-class submarines over the next six years will be an extremely challenging one. The VPA is primarily a land force with limited experience in coordinating operations in two, let alone three, dimensions,' said Professor Carlyle Thayer, a noted expert on Vietnam at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra.

'Vietnam needs to develop a naval doctrine that incorporates the capabilities that the Kilos will have. But more importantly, it will need to make a sustained commitment of resources - including funds - to make its submarine force combat ready. One key question is how long the transition period will take from the acquisition of submarines to effective absorption of their capabilities into the existing force structure.'

Professor Thayer guesses that the VPA will emerge with a capability somewhere between that of Singapore and Indonesia. The former has quickly and efficiently integrated submarines into its current force structure while the latter has found it difficult to maintain and fund its undersea force.

Most other procurements are likely to be less complex. The VPA has experience with anti-submarine warfare helicopters, for example, if Hanoi decides to modernise its current fleet and even move to seaborne operations using two Gepard frigates on order from Russia. Yet integrating AEW&C aircraft with fighters and ground assets - presuming this progression for the air force eventually unfolds - will be no easy task.

But there is another factor to consider. Force modernisation phased over time allows for the easier digestion of new capabilities, whereas the VPA appears set on a hurried meal.

rkarniol@sph.com.sg