Arms resurgence in South-east Asia

Robert Karniol, Defence Writer

SOUTH-EAST Asia has seen deliveries of major conventional defence equipment nearly double over the past five years, as compared with the period 2000-2004, according to a new report to be released today.

Malaysia led the regional pack with a surge of 722 per cent during the 2005-2009 period, while Singapore was up by 146 per cent and Indonesia by 84 per cent. Along the way, Singapore became the first South-east Asian country since the Vietnam War era to join the global list of top 10 arms importers.

The report was issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), whose arms transfer database has been compiled since 1950. It uses a rolling five-year average in order to smooth distortion through annual fluctuations.

The database is derived from open-source material and covers international arms transfers involving major conventional weapons, detailing importers and suppliers alike. Equipment produced locally is excluded, along with small arms.

The average volume of worldwide arms transfers for 2005-2009 was higher by 22 per cent over the period 2000-2004, according to Sipri. The rise in deliveries to the Asia/Oceania region averaged exactly half that, with the Southeast Asia sub-region significantly outpacing these results.

The arms build-up in South-east Asia, which includes the 10 Asean members, in large part represents a recovery after the 1997 economic crisis. On average, the region's buying burst returns it to 1995-1999 import levels, though Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore have ended up well ahead of the trend.

The Sipri data shows how harshly the economic crisis impacted arms imports in South-east Asia. With the base period 1995-1999 ascribed 100 points, the Asean total was 44 points for 2000-2004 and 104 points for 2005-2009. This compares with global figures of 75 and 92, respectively.

The comparative numbers for Indonesia are 64 and 118; for Malaysia, 17 and 137; and Singapore, 73 and 179. Thailand is well behind at 29 and seven, with Vietnam also continuing to fall short at 51 and 68. The other five Asean countries, taken together, are at 50 and 20, when compared with the 1995-1999 base period.

The economic downturn was shrugged off by several major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. The comparative arms transfer figures are 274 and 222 for China, 158 and 147 for India, and 183 and 152 for Australia. But Japan saw a steady slowdown at 39 and 39, South Korea down at 53 and 94, and Taiwan slid to 12 and 11 from the 100-point base.

Sipri researcher Siemon Wezeman points out that replacement programmes are another factor affecting the South-east Asia data. This is particularly felt here because force modernisation really took hold only in the late 1980s and early 1990s as the doctrinal emphasis shifted from internal security to conventional and offshore capabilities, with such assets now ageing.

'The F-5 fighters they bought then are being replaced, for example, though the new equipment is much more capable with advances in technology,' he said. 'At the same time, we're seeing a change from short-range to much longer range (platforms).'

But not all the acquisitions reflect replacement imperatives. Submarines are prominent among the new capabilities being introduced, together with systems unavailable 20 or 30 years ago such as unmanned aerial vehicles and beyond-visual-range missiles.

Mr Wezeman expects the upward trend in South-east Asia to continue for the foreseeable future. 'A number of countries clearly have a lot of old equipment that needs to be replaced. Indonesia is one. Vietnam is another,' he said. 'I would expect quite substantial force modernisation programmes in South-east Asia.'

The Sipri researcher also sees elements of an arms race in the region.

'There is some evidence of an arms race both within the region and in relation to powers outside the region,' he said. 'That is, an arms race in the sense that one country buys something and the others reacts to it, then the first one may itself react in turn.'

There is a deeper danger, Mr Wezeman further noted, in the Asia-Pacific region's lack of effective mechanisms to avoid or resolve tensions. 'In North-east Asia and for Taiwan-China, I don't see the solution of confidence-building and conflict prevention measures as something so relevant in the military sense. These are politically too loaded. And the same for South Asia, with India-Pakistan.'

South-east Asia has a mechanism in Asean, and in the Asean Regional Forum, through which it could address such challenges. But it has yet to bring these into effective play.

'The mechanism is there but it is not being used properly,' Mr Wezeman said.

Few in South-east Asia, or among its extra-regional partners, would disagree.