Can US squeeze into the 'Chinasean' bed?
America might be too preoccupied with its wars and economic woes

Peh Shing Huei, China Bureau Chief

WHEN US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared to Asean last year, 'We're back,' it was a clear signal that the Americans were looking to challenge China's rising influence in South-east Asia.

During the years the Bush administration left Asean on the far outfield of United States diplomacy, with Mrs Clinton's predecessor Condoleezza Rice skipping Asean summits twice in three years, Beijing nudged its way to the centre stage.

Trade boomed. Confucius Institutes mushroomed. Generous aid was doled out by the Chinese government.

The prospect of a symbiotic 'Chinasean' relationship seemed more likely than the other Sino-related diplomatic neologisms that mushroomed, from 'Chimerica' (China + America) to 'Chafrica' (China + Africa).

The question is this: Does the US have the stamina and strength to take on Beijing?

China worked hard to charm Asean during the years the US was preoccupied fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. China-Asean trade leapt nearly fourfold, from US $45.5 billion in 2001 to US $193 billion in 2008, culminating in the landmark China-Asean Free Trade Agreement (Cafta) which came into effect on Jan 1.

China also offered a total of US $25 billion in aid to Asean nations last year and pressed the right diplomatic buttons by blessing the 10-member grouping taking the lead in regional organisations, such as the East Asia Summit.

Beijing has also been flexing its 'soft power' - by, among other things, offering scholarships to Asean students. It is estimated that there are some 10,000 Thai students in China now, more than in the US, according to Asia Times.

And unlike Washington, which has put sporadic pressure on Asean to boot out the military-run Myanmar from the grouping, Beijing counts the regime as one of its allies. The principle of non-interference that Asean holds dear is in tune with the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) beliefs. As the CCP's second-ranking leader Wu Bangguo reiterated earlier last week, disagreements between countries should not become a pretext for interference.

Geography leans in favour of China too, given that it shares a border with Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar, proximity adding to the gravitational pull of the behemoth.

Yet geography could also very well be China's weak link, for proximity can also cause tensions, presenting an opening for the US to come back in.

The current extremely low water level of the Mekong River, for example, has been blamed on China. Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam have fingered China-based dams as the chief cause of their woes.

Hanoi is also increasingly annoyed at China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Chinese announced at the turn of the year that they plan to turn the disputed Paracel islands into a top-class tourist destination.

Myanmar, which counts China among its closest friends, is wary of Beijing after the junta's clash with an ethnic Han Chinese group late last year spilled over into Chinese territory, and caused a troop build-up by the Chinese.

Even Cafta is ruffling some Asean feathers. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines have all expressed reservations about the agreement, fearing that tariff cuts on Chinese products would leave their domestic products defenceless. Jakarta is even seeking to re-negotiate the deal.

Concerns about Beijing have also spilled into the military realm with a regional arms race intensifying in recent months, fuelled as much by intra-Asean tensions as the perceived threat of a rising China.

Both Vietnam and Myanmar have reportedly agreed to big weapons deals with Russia in recent months, despite strong sales pitch from a China eager to raise its profile as an arms exporter. While Beijing has had some success selling weapons to African and South American states, its reach has been limited in South-east Asia.

Myanmar inked a US $600 million (S $840 million) deal to buy 20 Russian MiG-29 fighter planes, just a fortnight after Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping visited Naypyidaw last December, a move interpreted as the junta's desire to cut its reliance on China.

In many ways, the current unease in the region is a reflection of centuries of Sinophobia, a hangover from the days when an imperial power saw the region as its backyard.

While proximity to China has brought economic benefits to South-east Asia, China's smaller southern neighbours have also been at the receiving end of its wrath on more than one occasion.

Older Vietnamese will not forget the quarter of a million troops that the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping sent in 1979 'to teach Vietnam a lesson' for invading Cambodia. And even till today, Vietnamese celebrate the annual Dong Da Festival, which marks a Vietnamese emperor's defeat of the Chinese Qing invaders in 1789.

The rest of Asean needs little reminder that the CCP was once supportive of local communist insurgencies in almost all the countries in the region.

All this history has led Asean to seek a balance of power in the region - the biggest factor in America's favour as it seeks a return to the region: Washington is very much welcomed by the hosts.

This message was made crystal clear by Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew last year, when he said in Washington: 'The size of China makes it impossible for the rest of Asia, including Japan and India, to match it in weight and capacity in about 20 to 30 years. So we need America to strike a balance.'

The welcome mat has been laid out. The Obama administration has indicated that it wants to play a role in South-east Asia. But with two wars to fight and a groaning economy to tend, one wonders if it would be a case of a willing heart but tiring flesh for the Americans.