China debates the need for overseas bases

Ian J. Storey, For The Straits Times

LAST month, three warships from China's People's Liberation Army Navy (Plan) were deployed to the Gulf of Aden on the country's fifth counter-piracy mission. Since operations first began in December 2008, the Plan has escorted more than 1,500 Chinese and foreign merchant vessels through the hazardous waters off the Horn of Africa.

China's anti-piracy patrols represent a significant milestone in that it is the first ever operational deployment for its military outside Asia. The missions have also triggered a debate within the national security establishment on a sensitive question: Should China establish foreign military bases?

China deployed its armed forces outside the country's borders during the Korean and Vietnam wars, but from the mid-1970s, it emphatically rejected foreign military entanglements. As the 2000 Defence White Paper asserted: 'China does not seek military expansion, nor does it station foreign troops or set up military bases in any foreign country.'

Subsequent defence policy papers, however, have omitted this prohibition, suggesting Beijing no longer considers the issue taboo. Several reasons may account for this.

Since the end of the Cold War, the primary driver of China's military modernisation programme has been to prepare the People's Liberation Army (PLA) for conflict scenarios in the Taiwan Strait. This is likely to remain the case for the foreseeable future despite a relaxation in cross-strait tensions.

However, as of 2004, China's leaders have tasked the PLA with 'new historic missions', going beyond core sovereignty issues such as Taiwan. Foremost among these is the need to promote and protect the country's rapidly expanding global economic interests.

For the Chinese navy, this has required a fundamental shift in doctrine from 'near seas active defence', which includes Taiwan and the South China Sea, to 'far seas defence' - including the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean or wherever the navy may be called on to defend the country's national interests.

One of the most important contributions the navy can make is to enhance China's sea-lane security, particularly the long energy supply lines that stretch for 9,600km from the Persian Gulf to China's eastern seaboard. These sea lines of communication currently transport 80 per cent of China's energy imports.

The counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden underscore the seriousness with which Beijing views sea-lane security. Chinese naval vessels, however, are operating far from home and for extended periods of time, putting sailors and ships under strain. Such considerations have led to calls from within the country for the establishment of overseas naval bases in East Africa, the Middle East or South Asia.

Last December, retired Rear-Admiral Yin Zhou argued that China urgently needed overseas bases for resupply, maintenance, shore leave and medical evacuation purposes. Rear-Adm Yin pointed out that other foreign navies such as that of France and Japan have established military facilities in places like Djibouti in support of their anti-piracy missions.

But China's Defence Ministry was quick to distance itself from Rear-Adm Yin's comments, noting that the Plan was satisfied with the current arrangements of replenishment by commercial vessels and port visits, an indication of the sensitivity of the issue. Nevertheless, Chinese security analyst Sheng Dingli at Fudan University countered that it was China's right to set up military bases overseas.

The idea that Beijing is intent on establishing a series of naval bases across Asia to protect its seaborne trade has been in currency since the mid-2000s when Indian analysts posited the 'string of pearls' theory. This theory holds that the Plan is actively engaged in gaining access to naval and commercial port facilities in Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

But while the string of pearls theory has become an article of faith in India, it has been met with scepticism by others who discern no concrete evidence of this strategy. The string of pearls is widely seen as a rhetorical device used by the Indian Navy to secure increased funding from the government.

Beijing's desire to establish a chain of permanent naval bases as suggested by Indian analysts seems highly unlikely because such a strategy would be prohibitively expensive, would alarm India, Japan and Asean, and undermine China's 'peaceful development' thesis.

A more realistic option would be for China to replicate the United States strategy of 'places not bases' by which Washington has negotiated a series of access agreements with South-east Asian governments, allowing US Navy ships to regularly visit regional ports for replenishment, maintenance, repair, and rest and recuperation, thereby obviating the need for permanent military bases. The strategy helps anchor the US military presence in the region.

China's nascent debate on the pros and cons of a forward-deployed naval presence in Asia is a natural consequence of the country's emergence as a global maritime power. Whether Beijing can persuade other major powers, already suspicious of China, of its merits, however, remains to be seen.

The writer is a fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.