China's Great Wall at sea

William Choong, Senior Writer

The South China Sea has hogged global headlines recently. Earlier this month, five Chinese vessels harassed the USNS Impeccable, an unarmed ocean surveillance ship, near Hainan Island. The United States subsequently said that it would send a destroyer to escort its surveillance ships in the area. China said it would send its largest fishery patrol ship, the Yuzheng 311, to waters around the Paracels.

According to some analysts, the recent Sino-American spats in the South China Sea belie China's new - and moderate - approach to the highly disputed area, a strategic and reportedly oil-rich body of water linking East Asia to the Indian Ocean. The last major military incident in the area occurred eight years ago in 2001, when China detained an American EP-3 spy plane and its crew. Before that, China and the Philippines clashed over Mischief Reef in 1995. China also had a major clash with Vietnam over the Spratlys in 1988 and the Paracels in 1974.

Dr Li Mingjiang, an assistant professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, says Beijing has shown more moderation in its South China Sea policy in recent years. The Yuzheng, he pointed out, is a fisheries administration vessel. It was sent to the Paracels, which are under effective and tight Chinese control. 'If the vessel was sent to the Spratlys, it would make a huge difference. I think China has continued its previous policy in the South China Sea: calculated moderation,' says Dr Li.

In the past decade, China has also sent all the right signals to the countries that have staked competing claims on various island groups in the South China Sea. It has signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and acceded to the Asean Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Recently, it also inked a deal with the Philippines and Vietnam to jointly explore energy resources in the South China Sea.

The rationale for all this is straightforward: Given an increasingly globalised Chinese economy, Beijing cannot afford to engage in armed hostilities in the South China Sea. Fiery nationalist rhetoric and the inclusive language of globalisation just do not mix.

'While the situation in the South China Sea is the best known and problematic of the maritime jurisdictional problems in East Asia, it is also the situation where the most progress is being made in establishing effective functional cooperation,' write Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers, the editors of Security And International Politics In The South China Sea: Towards A Cooperative Management Regime.

Sceptics, however, argue that there is a jarring dissonance between China's words and deeds: It continues to offer the world the language of 'peaceful rise', but its military build-up in the South China Sea suggests quite the opposite. According to Dr Bruce Elleman, a naval historian at the US Naval War College, People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces have been stationed on many disputed islands and atolls in the South China Sea. These bases are linked by elaborate signal stations and radar units, supported by a slew of air, maritime and land forces based on Hainan Island and the mainland.

'These naval assets may one day assist China in obtaining its long-range strategic goal of controlling all of the South China Sea,' writes Dr Elleman, adding that China had in 2007 designated a new 'city' on Hainan Island that will administer the disputed Paracels, Spratlys and Macclesfield Bank islands.

Dr Elleman's analysis overlooks China's increased cooperation with other countries that have staked claims in the South China Sea. But he is not alone. Mr John Pike, the director of GlobalSecurity.org, argues that the PLA Navy (PLAN) 'has an incredible capability to grab everything down there (in the South China Sea). If I was in PLAN, that's a no-brainer,' he is quoted as saying in the Washington Times.

Essentially, there are two perspectives on China's approach to the South China Sea. The first sees China as a responsible stakeholder willing to cooperate with other countries in the joint development of the islands in the sea. The second is more nuanced: It acknowledges China's desire to be a responsible stakeholder, but sees it playing a two-track game: diplomatic initiatives are pursued for joint development; but if they were to fail, force might be used.

The latter perspective does not say that China will use force any time soon. But it wisely sees that amid China's declarations about its 'peaceful rise', there have also been signs that it wishes to control maritime territories necessary for economic development.

In 1984, for example, Admiral Liu Huaqing, the head of the Chinese navy, called for a stronger navy to secure China's rich maritime resources. In the mid-1990s, General Mi Zhenyu, a former vice-commandant at the PLA's Academy of Military Science, said that 'China must develop a strong sea power to protect and not yield a single cm of its three million sq km of ocean territory'.

As Bernard Cole, author of The Great Wall At Sea: China's Navy Enters The 21st Century, notes, China's offers of diplomatic discussions and economic cooperation come with an important proviso: that China has 'indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and their adjacent waters'.

williamc@sph.com.sg